

# Deliberating the Weaponization of Terrorism Claims and Its Role in Fuelling Indo-Pak Hostilities

## What is the UNSC?

### MANDATE

The United Nations Charter established six main organs of the United Nations, including the Security Council. It gives primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security to the Security Council, which may meet whenever peace is threatened.

According to the Charter, the United Nations has four purposes:

- to maintain international peace and security;
- to develop friendly relations among nations;
- to cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights;
- and to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations.

All members of the United Nations agree to accept and conduct the decisions of the Security Council. While other organs of the United Nations make recommendations to member states, only the Security Council has the power to make decisions that member states are then obligated to implement under the Charter.

### MAINTAINING PEACE AND SECURITY

When a complaint concerning a threat to peace is brought before it, the Council's first action is usually to recommend that the parties try to reach agreement by peaceful means. The Council may:

- set forth principles for such an agreement;
- undertake investigation and mediation, in some cases;
- dispatch a mission;
- appoint special envoys; or
- request the Secretary-General to use his good offices to achieve a pacific settlement of the dispute.

When a dispute leads to hostilities, the Council's primary concern is to bring them to an end as soon as possible. In that case, the Council may:

- issue ceasefire directives that can help prevent an escalation of the conflict;
- dispatch military observers or a peacekeeping force to help reduce tensions, separate opposing forces, and establish a calm in which peaceful settlements may be sought.

Beyond this, the Council may opt for enforcement measures, including:

- economic sanctions, arms embargoes, financial penalties and restrictions, and travel bans;
- severance of diplomatic relations;
- blockade;
- or even collective military action.

A chief concern is to focus action on those responsible for the policies or practices condemned by the international community, while minimizing the impact of the measures taken on other parts of the population and economy.

## History of Indo-Pak Hostilities

The sovereign states of India and Pakistan came to a loggerhead from the inception of their creation and independence. The traditional analysis of this veritable civil war—the inhabitants of these two neighbouring states constituted a single political nation as subjects of the British Empire prior to 1947—has focused on three themes:

communalism, colonialism, and nationalism.<sup>1</sup> While all three have contributed to the conflictual relationship between the two countries, none of them, singly, can provide its definitive cause. This essay seeks to provide a succinct analysis of the origins and odyssey of this conflict and suggest some speculation as to its future resolution.

Theories abound surrounding the division of the subcontinent along religious lines. While official Pakistani historiography highlights the so-called “two nation” theory—the Hindus and the Muslims are two distinct communities or nations, each needing its own polity—nationalist historians of India blame colonial politics for the partition. A history of modern South Asia, published a decade ago, seeks to look beyond the politico-religious categorizations into “the contradictions and structural peculiarities of Indian society and politics of late colonial India” with a view to probing the pressures and politics behind the decision to partition British India into two adversarial nations.

The late Pakistani intellectual Hamza Alavi argued that “virtually every significant religious group in Undivided India, indeed the entire Muslim religious establishment,” opposed the Pakistan movement of the Muslim League (1906). Even some Muslim intellectuals and political activists wrote and strove for modernization and reformation of the Muslims, calling for *ijtihad* (the *jihad* of the mind), with little patience for the ranting mullahs or the idea of an Islamic or Muslim state.

## COMMUNAL CONSCIOUSNESS

However, communalism, an imprecise and ambiguous term that in South Asia can encompass both sectarian and cultural conflicts between Hindus and Muslims, did function as a crucial factor behind the idea of Muslim nationhood. Such an idea took hold of a class of English educated upper class Muslims (*Ashraf* or *mujahir*) employed in the expanding colonial government, the so-called Muslim “salarial,” of the Punjab, the UP (United Provinces renamed Uttar Pradesh after independence), Bengal, and Sind.<sup>6</sup> They sought sanctuary and security in the ranking colonial service that was alarmingly shrinking for the natives following the Great Mutiny of 1857.

Even the seminary educated, anti-colonial, priestly caste of the Sunni Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence in the UP, considered themselves Indian nationalists rather than upholders of an Islamic or Muslim state. The Muslims, like other religious groups, were bound and loyal to the nation of their birth. As a distinguished historian argues, “however profound the distinction between Hindus and Muslims may have been, the common ‘Hindi’ sentiment . . . incorporated the ‘Hindus’ and the ‘Muslims’ as the communities constituting the Indian empire of Akbar (r. 1556–1606) and his successors.” This sentiment inspired the Great Mutiny of 1857 in which the Hindu and Muslim sepoys rebelled against their common enemy, the British East India Company.

Admittedly, some Hindus of late colonial India harboured a communal consciousness or even the two-nation theory. The celebrated novelist and intellectual, Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay, equated Hindu consciousness with nation building. Even though later in life Bankim refined his stand on communal harmony, he continued to consider the Muslims as haters of Hindu gods.

In his critique of Bankim’s celebrated lyric *Bandemataram* (*Hail Motherland*, also *Mother Goddess*), Soumitra De observes that the Mother Goddess imagery alienated the Muslims, who regarded it as idolatrous. Even Bankim’s admirer, Aurobindo Ghosh, shrewdly observed that the Hindu formed the base and centre of the Indian nationality of his day.

Long before Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s notoriously misunderstood “Two Nations Theory” (January 19, 1940) that argued for equality among the Indian Muslims and Hindus, Vinayak D. Savarkar, the founding father of the Hindu Mahasabha (formed in 1915 as a Hindu counterpart of the Muslim League founded in 1906), articulated the same concept in his article “Hindutva” in 1923. The next year another leader of the Hindu Mahasabha, Lala Lajpat Rai, wrote in *The Tribune* about “a clear partition of India into a Muslim India and a non-Muslim India.”

The bone of Indo-Pakistani contentions is of course the erstwhile princely state of Kashmir, part of which was forcibly incorporated into the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and part into the Republic of India.

## FROM PARTITION OF BENGAL TO PARTITION OF THE BRITISH INDIAN EMPIRE

Such ethnic and communal consciousness found an echo in the racial vision of Herbert H. Risley, ethnographer, commissioner for the 1901 census, and author of *The People of India*. He highlighted the efficacy of the Hindu caste system with a view toward advising the government against imposing modernity on the caste-ridden Indian society that was apolitical and apathetic to change. Risley's racial vision helped the construction of caste identities and communalism in India. In a 1903 letter to the governments of Bengal, Assam, the Central Provinces, and Madras Risley, as home secretary, proposed Bengal's partition into two provinces—Eastern Bengal, and Assam and Bengal.

Risley's letter, published in the *India Gazette*, provoked widespread public discussion and protests throughout Bengal. It became clear to the intellectuals and the nationalists of Calcutta that the scheme for the partition of Bengal aimed to consolidate and separate the Bengali Muslims in Eastern Bengal, and to amalgamate the Bengali Hindus and the inhabitants of Bihar to the west and Orissa to the south, in the newly proposed Bengal. Risley's unspoken motive became transparent in the explanation provided by the British Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, who carried into effect the Partition of Bengal in 1905. Curzon explained to his superiors in London that he wanted to dethrone Calcutta "from its place as the centre of successful intrigue" against the British rule. Risley supported the Muslim League formed in 1906 and was instrumental in the award of separate electorates for Muslims in the 1909 Indian Council Act. "It was this award of separate electorates in 1909," writes Nicholas Dirks, "that set the stage for the demand of Pakistan and the eventual partition of the subcontinent."

From the partition of Bengal to the partition of the subcontinent, the years 1905 to 1947 witnessed colonial repression of the nationalist demands of the Indians, as well as the tragic triumph of the hydra-headed communalism that splintered and weakened the nationalist struggle. Thus, India and Pakistan locked horns from the instance of their birth that was preceded by large scale communal bloodshed and followed by massive migrations and the resultant colossal refugee problems. The bone of Indo-Pakistani contentions is of course the erstwhile princely state of Kashmir, part of which was forcibly incorporated into the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and part into the Republic of India. Thus, Kashmir remains the prize coveted by Pakistan since 1947. As "the fear of Hindu domination . . . engendered the first seeds of the demand for Pakistan" in the 1940s, almost six decades later, the superior military and economic power of India has "now translated into fears regarding the Indian threat to Pakistan's survival." What follows is a critical review of the veritable civil war between the two countries whose peoples once belonged to the same polity—the British Indian empire.

## **THE FIRST INDO-PAKISTAN WAR**

Under the scheme of partition provided by the Indian Independence Act of 1947, Kashmir—one of the 550 princely states of British India and ruled by the Hindu Maharaja Hari Singh, and geographically as well as strategically situated between India and Pakistan—was given the option to accede to either country. On October 22, 1947, the Muslim inhabitants of northern Kashmir, clamouring for Azad Kashmir (Free Kashmir) and joined by the tribals from the North-West Frontier sent by Pakistan, agitated against the possible accession to India. The Maharaja sought asylum in India and signed the Instrument of Accession on October 27. Subsequently, the military forces of Pakistan and India were deployed on both sides of the international border for a showdown, though no war was formally declared by either state. This was the context for the First Kashmir War during the fall and early winter of 1947.

On January 17, 1948, the United Nations Security Council established the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to mediate the dispute. It proposed ceasefire, demilitarization, and plebiscite on January 5, 1949. In April, the Security Council enlarged the membership of UNCIP, and on July 27, India and Pakistan signed the Karachi Agreement, which established a ceasefire line (CFL) along the international India-Pakistan border—a 700 kilometre line from Chammb in the south to Ladakh at map reference point NJ 9842—to be supervised by the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). A part of Kashmir bordering Pakistan (including the hilly northern region) covering an area of more than five thousand square miles and encompassing one million people came to be known as Azad Jammu and Kashmir, with its capital at Muzaffarabad, under the indirect rule by Pakistan. On March 10, 1951, UNCIP was terminated by the Security Council, though UNMOGIP continued its task of military observation.

## **THE SECOND INDO-PAKISTAN WAR**

The defeat of the Indian army by China during the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict was seen by Pakistan as a window of opportunity to achieve their aim to recover territory by force during the period when India had become demoralized. This military calculation of Pakistan's president Field Marshal Ayub Khan was realizable in the context of serious sectarian disturbances in Kashmir, especially between 1962 and 1964, when the region's Muslim population felt growing resentment of Indian control.

Pakistan's military began a probe in a disputed border zone with India—the Rann of Kutch, a 10,000 square mile salt marsh between the Gulf of Kutch and the Indus River basin. Several border skirmishes in the Rann escalated into a veritable war—the second Indo-Pak war—in April 1965, but ended on June 30, thanks to British intervention and the formation, under the aegis of the UN, of an arbitral tribunal (December 14, 1965) that three years later would award some 350 square miles of the land to Pakistan.

The weak Indian response and performance in the Battle of the Rann of Kutch encouraged the Pakistani military to settle the Kashmir question on the battlefield. A secret guerrilla operation in the Indian-occupied Kashmir, launched on May 26 and codenamed Operation Gibraltar, escalated into a full-scale battle along the CFL on August 15, but was routed by the Indian forces. Later in the month, the Pakistani army counterattacked the Indian military near Tith Wal, Uri-Bedore, and Poonch, followed by an Indian thrust into Azad Kashmir and occupation of a number of Pakistani mountain positions near the Kargil area, including the Haji Pir Pass. However, toward the latter half of September, the battle, especially the tank battle at Sialkot, staggered in a stalemate.

On September 4, 1965, the UN called for a ceasefire and asked the governments of India and Pakistan to cooperate with the task of supervising the observance of the ceasefire. Early in September, the UN Secretary General visited the subcontinent and wrote to the Security Council on September 16 about the sheer difficulty of reaching a peaceful agreement between India and Pakistan because of their insistence on mutually unacceptable conditions. On September 20, after the hostilities spread to the international borders between India and West Pakistan, the Security Council demanded a ceasefire. They increased the number of members of UNMOGIP and established a temporary administrative adjunct of this body, the UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM), to ensure supervision of the cease-fire and withdrawal of forces of both countries from the Rann of Kutch to Kashmir.

The cease-fire resolutions continued to be violated by both belligerents, and the Security Council met several times from late September through early November 1965. The special UN envoy met with the representatives of India and Pakistan, and on December 26, 1965, the cease-fire was achieved. Following a meeting at Tashkent in the Soviet Union in January 1966, India and Pakistan agreed to withdraw all armed personnel by February 25 to positions existing before the war. The next day, February 26, India and Pakistan withdrew their troops. The UNIPOM was disbanded on March 22.

## **THE FORMATION OF BANGLADESH AND THE THIRD INDO-PAKISTAN WAR**

The Tashkent Conference was followed by a political turmoil in Pakistan. Failure in the 1965 war discredited President Khan, who stepped down and was replaced by Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff, General Yahya Khan. Meanwhile, a democratic movement had swept both the western and eastern part of the bifurcated state of Pakistan. Bhutto founded the Pakistan People's Party with a quasi-socialist agenda in 1967 in the midst of postwar economic debacle, exacerbated further by violent student riots, but these did not deter Pakistan's first democratic election in October 1970. The election resulted in the total victory of the Awami League, the political party of the Bengali-speaking Muslims founded in Dhaka in 1949, in East Pakistan, thereby destroying the dominance of the Pakistan People's Party. The election also provided an opportunity for the Bengali Muslims of East Pakistan to escalate their long-standing demand for regional autonomy. The subsequent negotiations for power-sharing between East and West Pakistan reached an impasse, whereupon the Yahya government deployed massive military force against the East. On March 1, 1971, after the Martial Law Administrator replaced the civilian governor of East Pakistan and following the adjournment of the meeting of the Constituent Assembly, ethnic riots erupted and many Hindi-speaking Muslims (migrants from the state of Bihar in eastern India) were massacred.

Beginning on March 25, and continuing over the course of the succeeding months, about ten million Bengali Muslim refugees fled to India. This huge population influx became a threat to India's security and hence Indian intervention in the predicament of East Pakistan. Indian decision-makers also found it expedient to render Pakistan weak by helping the east secede from the west and thus demonstrate the weakness of Islam to cohere as a state. As a

scholar commented, “if the bonds of Islam could not ensure national integration, then what claim, if any, did Pakistan have to the Muslim-majority state of Kashmir?” India signed the Treaty of Peace, Cooperation and Friendship with the Soviet Union on August 9. Assured of Soviet support in and outside of the UN, India finally declared war on December 3.

This Indo-Pakistan War (aka Bangladesh War) also involved the two superpowers. The US dispatched massive naval support to Pakistan in the Arabian Sea in the West and in the Bay of Bengal to the East. Consequently, the Soviet Union sent six battleships to the Indian Ocean. For a time, it seemed as if the two Cold War rivals would engage in a proxy war. But the crisis passed away following an unconditional surrender of the Pakistani forces to the Indian army in Dhaka on December 16. The following Simla Accord between India and Pakistan (June 28 to July 2, 1972) resulted in the release of 93,000 Pakistani soldiers held by India as Prisoners of War, resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries, and reiteration of their commitment to desist from the use of force in settling the Kashmir dispute. They also agreed to rename the 1948 CFL as LoC (Line of Control). Pakistan lost its eastern half to the new nation state of Bangladesh on December 16, 1971.

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## **INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA**

In the last quarter of the twentieth century, there were a number of regional developments, including Indian government internal crises such as Indira Gandhi’s Emergency rule, the Sikh insurgency, the assassination of Indira, and the declaration of the state of Khalistan. Also, the nuclear race between India and Pakistan, and the rise of Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front-inspired terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, all aggravated Indo-Pakistan relations.

The LoC remained a point of controversy between the two nations. In 1984, India occupied the commanding heights of the strategic Siachen glacier in Ladakh. Pakistan’s demand that Indian forces withdraw from their positions and accept the boundary as was applicable in 1972 was countered by India’s insistence that Pakistan accept the Saltoro Ridge in the Karakoram range as the line of control. The contentious issue persists.

In April 1990, the Indian government became concerned over the intelligence received in New Delhi on Pakistani troop movements along the LoC in Kashmir. Consequently, the Indian government decided to increase its defence budget and publicize new threats from Pakistan and its strategic ally, the People’s Republic of China. Meanwhile, the Kashmir Valley was rocked by political violence. Pakistan officially accused India of mounting a massive striking force on the Indo-Pakistan borders between Bikaner and Rajasthan and responded to the Indian moves by calling up its military reserves by the end of the month. Fortunately, this brinkmanship was called off by both sides.

This sensible restraint and subsequent attempts at bilateral negotiations in New York notwithstanding, relations between the two countries remained strained throughout the early 1990s and even aggravated in May 1998 when they evaluated a series of nuclear weapons as a show of force. The UN Security Council communiqué of June 4 condemned the nuclear tests, expressed deep concern about the danger to peace and stability in the region, and urged “maximum restraint” and “mutually acceptable solutions that address the root causes of those tensions, including Kashmir.” Regrettably, despite the Indo-Pakistan agreement on February 26, 1999 (Lahore Declaration), India test-fired its new long-range Agni missile on April 11, 1999, followed by Pakistan’s medium-range Shaheen missile on April 14 and 15.

## **THE FOURTH INDO-PAKISTAN WAR**

Indo-Pakistan relations deteriorated further during the summer of 1999. The Pakistan-backed Kashmiri militant forces (*Hizbul Mujahideen*) crossed the LoC and occupied territories on the Indian side of the line. Pakistani forces disguised as local *Mujahideen* endeavoured to sever the Srinagar-Leh highway at Kargil and alter the status of the LoC. Most probably, Pakistan felt emboldened by its nuclear shield to raise the Kashmir issue. General Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan threatened to teach India an unforgettable lesson, and the chief of India’s army warned: “it may not be applicable next year.” The Kargil conflict lasted from June 6, when India launched its Operation Vijay, to late July, when 464 militants, 725 Pakistan regular soldiers, and 474 Indian soldiers were killed, and a few thousand were wounded on each side. The Pakistani infiltrators began retreating from Kargil on July 11 and India

recaptured the key peaks at Batalik. On July 12, the Pakistani Premier Nawaz Sharif proposed talks with the Indian Premier Atal Behari Vajpayee. Throughout the Kargil conflict, the US government remained steadfastly critical of Pakistan's provocation, and the determined stance of President Bill Clinton helped bring the otherwise intractable Pakistan government to its senses.

## **THE RISE OF TERRORISM**

The Kargil odyssey had an unsettling impact on the Pakistan military vis-à-vis the Pakistan government. In the estimation of the late former Premier Benazir Bhutto, "Kargil had been Pakistan's biggest blunder . . . The Indian government . . . outsmarted, outmanoeuvred, and outflanked the Pakistani leadership at every level." The hawkish General Musharraf ended the discredited civilian government of Nawaz Sharif in a coup d'état on October 14, 1999. He sought to mediate between the Kashmiri militants and separatists and the Indian government but had negligible effect. However, with the emergence of Jaish-e-Muhammad, joined by the already active extremist group Lashkar-e-Toiba (and especially following the fall of the Taliban government in Afghanistan in 2001) Pakistan, together with Azad Kashmir and the United Front of Afghanistan, have become the hub of terrorists.

In fact, on December 13, 2001, just a couple of months following the September 11 carnage in the United States, the Lashkar and Jaish suicide squad attacked the Parliament House in New Delhi killing nine people. This incident was followed seven years later with more than ten coordinated shooting and bombing attacks across Mumbai, including the terrible bomb attack on the famous hotel, Taj Mahal Palace and Tower, which lasted from November 26 to 29, killing two hundred people and wounding over three hundred. Although both occasions brought India and Pakistan to the brink, sober judgments on the part of the two countries prevailed and open confrontations averted.

## **THE FUTURE**

As to an assessment of the political, military, and diplomatic behaviours of both countries, India was criticized in 2003 for aspiring to an enormous power status in South Asia and for "showing [India's] . . . military prowess through arms purchases, joint military exercises . . . and their economic strength." Nevertheless, since 2001 the Indian government has pursued a forward-looking economic policy. This has resulted in increased domestic prosperity, expanded globalization, and political elites opting for policies of negotiation and diplomacy regarding Pakistan.

Unfortunately, Pakistan's military regime invested in its military establishments and in training and equipping terrorists in the surrounding regions. Consequently, Pakistan's economy is in shambles, and its jingoism has been a politics of despair. Since September 2008, with an elected democratic government under the presidency of the Pakistan People's Party leader Asif Ali Zardari, the country has been fighting against the Taliban terrorists, intent on destroying its fledgling civilian government and capturing its nuclear arsenal. The time may be ripe to begin the process for a rapprochement between the two neighbours. While Indian use of force has to reckon with domestic political concerns and pressures, Pakistan's response could prove to be problematic because of its deep connection with militant Islam, its two-nation theory-based claims on Kashmir, and reliance of its national identity in an ongoing conflict with India.

## **State Sponsored Terrorism and its Harms**

PLEASE NOTE: The Following Sub-Topic is heavily inspired from the papers cited, please read the papers to gain a deeper understanding of the same.

State sponsored terrorism is identified as a growing threat impacting nations of all sizes in almost every region of the world. Whether industrialized or developing, wealthy or poor, all nations are adversely impacted by terrorism and its lasting repercussions. Modern terrorist organizations are better funded, well organized, and well informed, largely because more terrorist organizations are sponsored by governments instead of individuals. Because of this evolution, it is more important than ever for nations to understand these facts. This phenomenon is particularly dangerous and presents unique problems globally. When a government sponsors terrorist activities, the world is confronted with the potential for violence on an unprecedented scale.

Defining terrorism can be complex due to its many variants. It is broadly understood as a process of pursuing social, economic, political, religious, and psychological change through coercion, threats, and violence. State sponsored terrorism is defined as the pursuit of social, economic, political, religious, and psychological change by a government, often through a nongovernmental organization. Terrorism sponsored by governments is a major problem for global stability, economic growth, and social advancement. State sponsored terrorism significantly increases the scope and magnitude of the overall terrorism threat because governments possess enormous resources and can help terrorists reach a much broader sector of the population with their attacks. These terrorist organizations are highly trained, have modern equipment, receive real-time detailed intelligence, and are well organized. State sponsored terrorists are extremely dangerous because they have access to the same type and quality intelligence as those trying to detect and counter terrorist activities.

The factors contributing to state sponsored terrorism are broad in scope and often complex, with typically no single, well-defined reason for its increase. Understanding these factors often requires extensive evaluation of the history, politics, and religious intricacies specific to the sponsoring nations, as well as the background of target nations. One event to consider is the process adopted by the international community to resolve national and international disputes, which may have directly or indirectly contributed to the increase in state sponsored terrorism. This is because many nations perceive that larger and wealthier nations often have greater influence in the decision-making and international policy-making process within mechanisms like the United Nations. For smaller nations, the UN may be seen as an unlikely vehicle for conflict resolution or advancing their agenda, which can be frustrating and potentially lead some nations to seek unorthodox means. The underlying factors compelling individuals, organizations, and even governments to sponsor such activities are consistently social, economic, political, religious, or cultural. Governments cannot change these fundamental facts, making state sponsored terrorism difficult to combat.

The impact of state sponsored terrorist activities extends well beyond a single catastrophic event. For most nations, systemic and institutional changes occur within core public, private, and non-profit organizations that dramatically alter the lives of citizens. Governments are forced to dedicate a larger portion of their budgets to detection and deterrence efforts to protect commerce, trade industries, shipping, travel, and business, as well as consumer confidence. Terrorist attacks change international interactions, especially when the threat is lodged by a nation's leader. International aid agencies may become less willing to send workers into regions where states sponsor terrorist activities, adversely impacting citizens in desperate need. This strains the limited resources of poor and developing nations by forcing them to address basic needs, particularly devastating when international aid might be available, but the threat of attack serves as a deterrent. The threat of terrorist attacks can, and often does, serve as a critical determinant for international relief organizations regarding whether to provide aid in specific regions.

Political stability is a critical component in the state sponsored terrorism dialogue. While even oppressive regimes can create some degree of stability that makes it difficult for terrorists to operate, some literature suggests that nations adopting a democratic system are more likely to experience terrorist attacks. This implies that state sponsored terrorism is a threat to poor developing nations transitioning toward or in the early stages of democracy. Governments that sponsor terrorist organizations need to recruit. It is easier to recruit in regions lacking a stable government or where the government is weak in enforcing laws. The international community is encouraged to work diligently to strengthen government institutions within countries where terrorist organizations recruit.

Terrorism has adverse effects on key social indicators such as poverty, healthcare, and education. The prospect of terrorist attacks changes how people and governments conduct business and can limit social growth and development. For example, parents may choose not to send children to school, and clinics providing care to the poor may close. These closures impact institutions addressing social issues that could improve the quality of life and standard of living, which in turn can positively impact economic development.

Economically, terrorism destabilizes systems and negatively impacts macroeconomic variables. It profoundly affects local economies, especially those relying on travel and tourism, leading to reduced revenue in service sectors. According to research cited, terrorism has devastating and lasting economic consequences. Studies have shown a positive relationship between the number of terrorist attacks and real GDP growth (though this particular correlation seems counter-intuitive based on the general tone, it is stated in the source citing specific research). Terrorist activities reduce foreign investment because companies are generally reluctant to invest where attacks are pervasive, widespread, or likely, viewing attacks on foreign corporations as a signal that they are targets and

terrorism is rising. This has the potential to make national and international news. Pirate attacks, considered a form of terrorism sometimes operating with seeming government immunity, have enormous economic consequences, increasing shipping costs for essential goods and services and adversely impacting industries, national economies, and the quality of life, particularly in poor countries.

State sponsored terrorism also impacts infrastructure and production. In Nigeria, attacks on oil pipelines reduce production capacity, increase costs, and decrease government revenue used for services. Such attacks are common regionally, especially between countries with longstanding political differences and border conflicts. They are effective for state-supported terrorists aiming to disrupt production and cripple economies of bordering nations.

A devastating consequence for poor and developing nations is the impact on the quality of life. Many such countries have valuable natural resources but limited capacity to extract or export them, leading international organizations to get involved and become targets. Innocent civilians suffer the most because state sponsored terrorism directed at infrastructure, production facilities, and civilians increases government protection costs, reducing revenue available for essential social services. Studies indicate that terrorist attacks adversely impact GDP and decrease per capita income, which is particularly devastating for small nations relying on fewer industries compared to large, industrialized nations. Attacks on key infrastructure like ports can slow down shipping and reduce revenue.

Fear is a tremendous weapon for terrorists, including state sponsored ones, used to alter the lives of citizens in communities and nations. Following events like the September 11, 2001, attacks, the lives of citizens changed, and the fear of another attack became a fact of life. Studies suggest citizens are willing to pay substantially higher taxes to prevent further attacks. State sponsored terrorist activities can also lead to isolated military retaliation and increased border conflicts. However, military retaliation often does little to decrease terrorist activities or state support, and in most cases, it may serve as a catalyst to recruit more terrorist candidates, especially when civilians are injured. A military approach is deemed neither feasible nor effective in the long term.

Identifying viable solutions to global state sponsored terrorism has been a focus of governments, policy makers, social scientists, and academicians. A crucial fact is that no single nation can combat state sponsored, global, or regional terrorism alone; it must be a concerted and collaborative international effort. This requires putting pressure on leaders and nations that support, train, fund, or provide safe areas for terrorists. Companies and international corporations are a key component and can help significantly reduce support by ceasing business with countries that sponsor terrorism.

Governments must also constantly improve their capacity to respond to viable, substantiated threats. **Embargos have proven useless in this context.** Once a threat is confirmed, a quick and decisive response must be planned and implemented with dedicated resources and personnel on an international scale, taking precautions to ensure civilians are not harmed. It is also essential to limit terrorist organizations' access to resources like money, military hardware, and training facilities that could make them viable threats in the future. Eliminating terrorist safe havens is an extremely important aspect of the war on state sponsored terrorism. Nations that harbour terrorists must be dealt with in the harshest terms through concerted actions supported by the entire international community, ensuring terrorists have nowhere to go and no means to acquire the tools of their trade.

In regions where terrorists recruit and train, a concerted effort should be made to educate people about the holistic, long-term adverse consequences of terrorist activities. People need to be educated on the drain on resources and the impact on citizens, including the potential earning power lost by young men who become terrorists instead of breadwinners.

## **PAKISTAN AND STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM**

PLEASE NOTE: The following is an extract from an OP-ED written by an Indian IPS Officer in an Indian News Paper, The Hindu, the following are the personal views of the author and neither is it attributable to any delegate, nor to be accepted as fact. It is an interesting read which is being added to encourage delegates to read facts and figures from various perspectives.

*“The Soviet-Afghan War of 1979 was the inflection point when Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), backed by U.S. funding, systematically cultivated jihadi infrastructure that evolved into today’s sophisticated terror network. This deliberate cultivation created fighters with diverse objectives — Kashmir-focused aggression, control in Afghanistan,*



sectarian violence, and ideological warfare. Recent data has confirmed a resurgence of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism across the region. This analysis examines Pakistan's entrenched terror ecosystem through OSINT, declassified records, and academic research.

### ***Terrorist outfits which are said to have Pakistan support***

*A key outfit is the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The LeT emerged in the 1990s as Pakistan's premier proxy organisation against India; it operates under Hafiz Muhammad Saeed — a designated terrorist operating in Pakistan despite international sanctions. Its rigid command structure includes Zafar Iqbal, Muhammad Yahya Mujahid, and Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi who was one of the masterminds of the Mumbai attacks in 2008 (he was 'arrested' but protected within Pakistan's judicial system).*

*LeT's infrastructure centres around its 200-acre headquarters complex, the Markaz-e-Taiba, near Lahore, with additional bases strategically positioned across Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and around urban centres including Lahore, Peshawar, and Karachi. Ideologically, the outfit adheres to the virulent Ahl-e-Hadith doctrine (a conservative faction with a strict adherence to the Koran) specifically targeting India, which it propagates through its network of 300+ madrassas across Pakistan. Intelligence confirms at least 16 documented training camps of the LeT across Pakistan and occupied territories. The group's operational sophistication is demonstrated through attacks such as the 2008 Mumbai attacks where 166 people were killed; the 2006 Mumbai train bombings (209 killed); and an indirect hand in the 2010 German Bakery bombing in Pune (17 killed), orchestrated by the Indian Mujahideen (SIMI).*

*LeT maintains transnational reach with recruitment networks identified in 21 countries, with dedicated cells both in Bangladesh and Nepal facilitating operations against India. Its financial architecture combines direct ISI funding, estimated to be around \$25-50 million annually; gulf-based private donors from Saudi Arabia and the UAE; Pakistani diaspora contributions through Islamic charitable fronts; and business operations including commodity trading and real estate.*

*Then there is the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). Established in 2000 by Masood Azhar following his 'release' during the IC-814 hijacking, the JeM represents Pakistan's suicide terrorism capability. Azhar maintains direct control over the outfit along with his brother, Abdul Rauf Asghar, by handling operations through specialised wings — the Askari (military) wing for direct operations; Dawati (missionary) wing for recruitment and radicalisation; and the intelligence wing for reconnaissance.*

*JeM's infrastructure centres around its fortified headquarters in Bahawalpur, Punjab, with satellite facilities. It also has seven major training camps in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province, four in PoK, and has recently re-established camps in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. The Balakot training complex, targeted by Indian airstrikes in 2019 but subsequently rebuilt, specialises in suicide attack training. Its ideology combines Deobandi fundamentalism (a movement within Sunni Islam) with an apocalyptic worldview glorifying martyrdom operations.*

*JeM's operational history includes the 2001 Indian Parliament attack, and the 2019 Pulwama suicide bombing where 40 security personnel were killed. The group pioneered fidayeen (suicide) attacks in Kashmir and have demonstrated sophisticated capabilities with respect to vehicle-borne Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and military installation infiltration.*

*JeM's financing includes the Al-Rehmat Trust front charity, which collects \$10-15 million annually; trading companies and commodity businesses; protection rackets in Bahawalpur and surrounding areas; documented ISI funding through intermediaries; and real estate holdings valued over \$30 million.*

### ***Supporting players and state support***

*Some of the less mainstream players in Pakistan's terror network include the Haqqani Network which operates as a semi-autonomous ISI extension along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Led by Sirajuddin Haqqani — now Afghanistan's interior minister despite a \$10 million U.S. bounty — the network serves as both an ISI proxy in Afghanistan and a facilitator for anti-India operations.*

*Then there is the Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIS-K), which emerged from Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) defectors, with operational bases in eastern Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal areas. Though ideologically opposed to Pakistani*

*objectives, evidence suggests elements within Pakistan's security establishment tacitly allow certain ISIS-K operations.*

*The Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM) also functions as a specialised recruitment pipeline for Pakistani proxy groups, maintaining extensive networks within Pakistan's religious seminary system, with over 60% of recruits channelled to LeT and JeM operations.*

*Therein, Pakistan's relationship with terrorist organisations transcends allegations — it is documented through concrete evidence, defector testimonies, international intelligence assessments, and financial tracking. The ISI has operationalised terrorism as state policy through a three-tiered system — strategic direction and funding through specialised “S-Wing” units; operational support via retired military personnel; and by providing material assistance such as weapons, training infrastructure, and intelligence. Despite officially joining the ‘War on Terror’ post the 9/11 tragedy in the U.S., Pakistan has maintained a calculated policy distinguishing between ‘good terrorists’ (serving Pakistani interests) and ‘bad terrorists’ (targeting Pakistani assets). The consequences have been devastating — over 45,000 lives lost due to Pakistani hand in terrorism since 1990.*

*Pakistan's persistent appearance on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) “grey list” (2008-2010, 2012-2015, 2018-2022) is international recognition of its systemic failure to dismantle terror financing networks. The most damning evidence comes from Pakistan itself — former President Pervez Musharraf openly admitted to training terrorists for Kashmir operations, while former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif confirmed state support for terrorist groups. Recently, the current Pakistani minister for foreign affairs said that they have been doing the “dirty work” for Western powers for a long time. A similar statement was also recently made by Bilawal Bhutto.*

### ***Funding and radicalisation***

*The funds sustaining this infrastructure operate through sophisticated mechanisms designed for plausible deniability. Religious charities serve as the primary collection points, with 40+ identified front organisations raising \$150-200 million annually. Other sources include state funding through classified budget allocations (estimated \$100-125 million annually); money laundering operations through hawala networks, with major hubs in Dubai, Karachi, and Peshawar; narcotics trafficking along the Afghanistan-Pakistan-India corridor generating an estimated \$75 million annually; and cryptocurrency, with inputs indicating \$15+ million moved through crypto channels in 2023.*

*Despite FATF pressure forcing some regulatory changes, Pakistan has preserved these financial pipelines by simply renaming organisations while maintaining core networks.*

*Apart from the financial infrastructure, Pakistan's terror network also relies on a sophisticated radicalisation apparatus. Pakistan has over 30,000 madrassas, with 10-15% of them directly linked to extremist organisations. Other modes through which terrorism is encouraged include curriculum in religious schools which often promote violent jihad, particularly against India; publications, websites, and social media channels disseminating extremist ideology; and a targeted recruitment of vulnerable youth from economically disadvantaged regions. This creates a self-sustaining radicalisation pipeline continuously replenishing terrorist ranks.*

### ***Evolution of the network***

*Pakistan's terror infrastructure demonstrates remarkable adaptability. It first made its appearance in the 1990s through direct insurgency in Kashmir through the LeT and HUM. Then by the early 2000s, the JeM had also emerged as a specialised suicide attack outfit.*

*However, post-9/11, operations of such terror groups became more sophisticated with greater plausible deniability; they started integrating cyber capabilities and information warfare. The Taliban's 2021 return to power in Afghanistan significantly emboldened this infrastructure. There has been a re-establishment of training facilities in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan; an increase in infiltration attempts along the Line of Control (2023-2024); and enhanced operational coordination between LeT, JeM, and Taliban-affiliated groups.*

*Thus, Pakistan's terror infrastructure represents a deliberate, state-supported system that has survived for decades through deep institutional support within Pakistan's security establishment, which views these proxy forces as strategic assets rather than terrorist threats. The April 2025 Pahalgam attack, killing 26 civilians and forensically linked to LeT operatives trained in Pakistan, demonstrates the enduring threat.*

*Such an infrastructure poses immediate danger to regional stability, particularly to India, which continues bearing the human cost of Pakistan's proxy warfare. This is not merely a bilateral issue but a global challenge which threatens the rules-based international order. Effectively addressing this threat requires unwavering international pressure on Pakistan to permanently dismantle — not merely rebrand or temporarily restrain — these terrorist organisations and the state apparatus that sustains them.”*

## **QARMAs**

1. How should the resolution define state-sponsored terrorism within this regional context (INDO-PAK), and what frameworks should it establish to address its impacts on peace, development, and governance?
2. Given the limitations of unilateral military responses, what forms of international cooperation and non-military interventions should be endorsed to dismantle terrorist networks and address the root causes of radicalization?
3. What concrete actions should the UNSC take to investigate and hold accountable states alleged to support, fund, train, or shelter terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed?
4. What sorts of investigations and intel seeking operations can the UNSC conduct in order to identify such states in Q.2?
5. How can we address the dangers posed by the nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan, especially during periods of heightened tension and military brinkmanship?
6. What specific measures should the resolution propose for the peaceful settlement of the Kashmir conflict, referencing prior UN interventions (e.g., UNCIP, UNMOGIP) and ongoing disputes over the Line of Control and contested territories like Siachen?